

## Rethinking the Question of “the Termination of Philosophy”


—Based on the Text of *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*

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**Abstract:** *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (hereafter referred to as the work), a classic text of Marxist philosophy, centers on two core themes: the fundamental question of philosophy and the question of the termination of philosophy. On the basis of systematically sorting out relevant theoretical debates in academia, this paper conducts an in-depth analysis of the “termination of philosophy” from four dimensions. First, it carries out semantic analysis and essential definition of the term “termination”, clarifies the translation controversies over the original German word Ausgang, and identifies its core connotation as the sublation and paradigm shift between the traditional speculative old philosophy and the Marxist practical new philosophy. Second, it defines the theoretical orientation and boundary of “the termination”, confirming that the object of “the termination” in Engels’ context refers to the purely speculative traditional philosophical system represented by Hegel. Third, it explores the genealogical connection between Feuerbach’s philosophy and classical German philosophy, verifying that Feuerbach’s philosophy is not a component of classical German philosophy nor its representative figure. Fourth, it explores the theoretical limitations of Marx and Engels’ proposition on the “termination” of the old philosophy, as well as the historical trend and practice-based, reality-oriented development paradigm of philosophy after this “termination”. By clarifying core concepts and theoretical disputes, this paper deepens the understanding of the essence of the Marxist philosophical revolution. And it provides important theoretical resources and methodological enlightenment for resolving the speculative predicament of contemporary philosophy and promoting philosophy’s involvement in practical reality.

**Keywords:** The Termination of Philosophy; Marxist Philosophy; Classical German Philosophy; Feuerbach’s Philosophy; Sublation; Practical Philosophy



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The work *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* explores two intertwined core issues: first, the explicit thread centers on the basic categories of philosophy, systematically analyzing the intrinsic connection between the materialist conception of history of Marxist philosophy and the old materialist theoretical system represented by Feuerbach’s philosophy, and clearly revealing the critical absorption of Hegelian idealist dialectics by Marxist philosophy. On this basis, Marxist philosophy constructs a new materialist conception of history, thus

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achieving a fundamental transcendence of traditional philosophy; Second, the implicit thread explores the concept of the termination of philosophy, aiming to analyze how Engels elaborated on the “termination of philosophy” within the framework of Marxist philosophy, and further clarify the unique positioning and essential characteristics of Marxist philosophy as a scientific world outlook and methodology based on practice and geared towards promoting social change.

## 1 Semantic Analysis and Essential Interpretation of the Term “Termination”

There are different opinions in academia on the translation and connotation of Ausgang. From Engels’ specific historical context, Yu Wujin (2006) made an in-depth analysis and pointed out that in the titling of *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, the core connotation of Ausgang should be interpreted as “the way out” rather than “termination”. From his perspective, Marx did not regard Feuerbach as the one who ended classical German philosophy, but clearly identified Hegel as this figure. To grasp the core connotation of the text accurately, it would be more appropriate to title the work “Hegel and the Termination of Classical German Philosophy”, because Hegel is the culmination and ultimate representative of the classical German philosophical system, and the further development of his ideas marks the termination of this philosophical tradition.

Zhu Guangqian (1980) also emphasized that the deviation in the translation of core concepts in the work can easily lead to misunderstandings in academia about the central topic. He emphasized that in this work, Engels attempted to reveal how Marx constructed a theoretical framework of dialectical materialism and historical materialism based on the critical inheritance of the achievements of classical German philosophy represented by Hegel and Feuerbach, rather than simply declaring that classical German philosophy had reached the “termination” in Marx’s time. The original connotation of Ausgang in the original text should be understood as “way out” or “outcome”, which specifically refers to a guiding or conclusive state in German. In the traditional English, French and Russian translations, the term is often rendered directly as “end” or “termination”, which has inadvertently perpetuated this misunderstanding in the Chinese translation process, resulting in a misinterpretation of the original meaning.

In response to this translation controversy, some scholars have proposed that the translation of the work as its Chinese title has certain rationality, and through theoretical analysis and comparison with the historical facts of philosophy, it provides strong support and argumentation. From a theoretical perspective, Engels elaborated on the intrinsic connection between the integrity and closedness of Hegel’s philosophical system, regarding it as the fundamental basis for the termination of classical German philosophy.

From the perspective of the history of philosophy, Engels pointed out that “the revolution of 1848 left all philosophy aside without hesitation, just as Feuerbach left his Hegel aside. As a result, Feuerbach himself was pushed into the background” (Engels, 2018: 16).

This means that revolutionary practice not only sublates the old philosophical system but also heralds the rise of new ideological trends of the era, marking a new stage in the relationship between theory and practice. From this perspective, Feuerbach’s role has actually been marginalized, and revolutionary practice has transcended the theoretical framework of traditional philosophy, emerging as the core driving force of the historical process. The accuracy and comprehensiveness of Zhu Guangqian’s assertion that “classical German philosophy takes Hegel and Feuerbach as its core representatives” still need to be further verified and confirmed through in-depth textual genealogical analysis.

Unlike the above two perspectives, He Zhonghua (2010) emphasized that the concept of Ausgang in the title of *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* essentially reveals the fundamental transcendence and reconstruction of the “old philosophy” by the “new worldview”. This transcendence and transformation are not rooted in the closedness of Hegel’s philosophical system, nor are they caused by the rejection of theory by the 1848 European revolutionary wave. Its underlying factors actually stem from Engels’ exposition of the construction and consolidation of the emerging worldview in Marxist philosophy.

“To gain a deeper understanding of the profound meaning of ‘termination’, one should start with Engels’ famous statement that ‘philosophy was completed by Hegel’ as the starting point for analysis.” (Engels, 2018: 11).

On this basis, Yu Wujin (1993) proposed that Engels regarded Hegel as the one who brought classical German philosophy to an end, thus questioning and denying the appropriateness of translating Ausgang as “end”. However, this argument did not fully explore the essential connotation of the concept of “termination”, thus exposing the limitations of his theoretical perspective. In fact, the core of this argument lies in the fact that the traditional philosophical model, characterized by speculation and abstraction, reached its historical culmination in Hegel’s philosophical system and thus entered its final phase.

The integrity of Hegel’s philosophical system is not directly related to his so-called “termination”, because even after his death, Hegel’s ideas still maintain significant influence, widely permeating various disciplines and even daily life, demonstrating lasting influence. Its internal integrity does not solely determine the true termination of a system but depends on the disruptive transcendence of emerging ideological systems, which reflects the dynamic and complex evolution of knowledge.

Therefore, in Engels’ historical context, the core connotation of the concept of “termination” is not equivalent to “way out”, but a dialectical process of sublation and the successive evolution and paradigm shift of old worldviews and new paradigms. Engels clearly defined his theoretical mission—to deconstruct the inherent connection between philosophy and worldview, with the aim of restoring the essential authenticity of worldview by subverting traditional philosophical systems.

According to his viewpoint, philosophy is a unique manifestation of the worldview of a specific historical period, and only when the speculative research method of traditional philosophy comes to an end can the worldview gain freedom and independence from this exclusive historical category of philosophy. Engels clearly elaborated on the transformation of the role of Marxist new materialism, positioning it as no longer belonging to the realm of traditional speculative philosophy, but evolving into a universal worldview.

## 2 Theoretical Direction and Boundary Delineation of “Termination”

Engels clearly pointed out in his work the specific meaning of the concept of “termination”: “For philosophy that has been expelled from nature and history, if there is anything left, it is only a pure field of thought: the doctrine of the laws of the thought process itself, namely logic and dialectics.”(Engels, 2018: 54)

From Engels’ perspective, with the rapid advancement of natural sciences and the establishment of the Marxist materialist conception of history, purely speculative philosophy has been excluded from the study of natural phenomena and historical processes and has been confined to the research field of exploring the laws of thinking. The specific meaning of the “termination” object in this discourse has become a focal point of academic debate.

A universal interpretation of the concept of “termination” prevailed in the Second International and the former Soviet academic circle, interpreting it as synonymous with “completion”. It infers that the remarkable progress of science in the late 19th century marked the decline of natural philosophy. At the same time, the emergence of the Marxist materialist conception of history declared the decline and transcendence of historical philosophy. Philosophical activities can only exist in the realm of abstract thinking from then on.

With the continuous development of cognitive science, the study of logic and dialectics, which focuses on revealing the “operational laws of thinking”, is gradually replacing traditional philosophical models, suggesting that the discipline of philosophy may face overall dissolution. Guo Ying and Liu Huaiyu (2016) have made an in-depth analysis of the two theoretical biases in this view: first, in the German linguistic context, the term “End” not only denotes “termination”, but also connotes the profound meanings of “realization” and “redemption”.

Engels’ original intention was to expound how Marxism achieved a comprehensive transcendence and reconstruction of the previous philosophical system, aiming to overcome the limitations of earlier philosophical theories. However, to interpret “End” merely as “completion” is to offer a one-sided understanding of its rich connotation, ignoring its profound positive implications.

Second, Engels explicitly rejected the view of “terminating all philosophy” and emphasized that Marxism did not seek to completely overthrow philosophy, but focused on the “completion” and “dialectical” transformation of systematic philosophy (or academic philosophy). Afterwards, valuable philosophical thinking is not limited to traditional systematic frameworks, but has developed new forms that meet the needs of the new era. These forms go beyond the boundaries of the old philosophical system and exhibit more diverse and innovative characteristics.

Engels emphasized the fundamental transcendence of Marxism over traditional philosophy, which is reflected in the close integration of dialectics, materialism and epistemology into the actual process of social development, forming a new non-traditional and non-systematic philosophical paradigm. The essential significance of the termination of philosophy lies in internalizing the logic and dialectics of Marxism into concrete scientific research, aiming to subvert and transcend the rigid philosophical systems that oppose the revolutionary and critical spirit.

In depth, regarding “termination” as merely “the end of existence” is a limited interpretation. Engels’ core argument aims to demonstrate the revolutionary subversion of traditional philosophical frameworks by Marxism and the novel cognitive theories and world outlook it constructs, thus marking the “termination” of classical German philosophy in its historical dimension.

Yi Junqing’s (1988) research further confirmed this argument. In the 1870s and 1880s, Engels, through his in-depth analysis of the advancement of natural sciences and his debate with Dühring, clearly declared the termination of the historical stage of “traditional philosophy” and comprehensively elaborated on the essential characteristics and theoretical system of “new materialism” in this context.

The philosophical categories referred to by Engels, which are terminated and sublated, specifically denote the system represented by Hegelian philosophy—the one that reached the culmination of traditional philosophy. This discourse profoundly reveals the evolution and innovation in the process of philosophical development. One of the core directions of the termination of philosophy is Hegelian philosophy, although this is not the only focus; Marx’s basic viewpoint is that the development of history should not be limited to the internal deduction of philosophical concepts, and philosophy should not cling to its theoretical independence and exist apart from the actual social process.

On the contrary, philosophy should be regarded as an indispensable and integral part of the practical movement of

history, deeply embedded in and reflecting the essence of this dynamic process.

Based on the analysis of previous researchers, it can be clearly pointed out that Engels' discourse on the termination of philosophy actually refers to the historical termination of the purely speculative traditional philosophical system represented by Hegel, rather than a complete denial of the existence or function of philosophy. This issue has sparked extensive discussions in academia, particularly exploring whether Marx and Engels can be regarded as the thinkers who transcended traditional speculative philosophy. The following section will systematically summarize the theoretical explanations and core debates of major scholars on this issue.

You Zhaohe (2007) pointed out that within the theoretical framework of Marx and Engels, the concept of "the termination of philosophy" contains two profound meanings: firstly, it marks the historic termination of a specific German "speculative philosophy"; Secondly, it is the gradual disappearance of the universal concept of "philosophy" or "philosophy itself" in the context of the development of scientific positivism. These two layers of meaning are closely intertwined and internally connected, together constituting the core content of the transformation of Marxist philosophy and the essence of its "philosophical termination" concept.

From the perspective of internal correlation, the ultimate construction of "speculative philosophy" not only directly shapes the practical level of "philosophical termination theory" but also its universal termination deeply defines the historical dimension of the proposition. This historical dimension, as the fundamental connotation of the theory of the termination of philosophy, runs through and influences the philosophical revolutionary theoretical system of Marx and Engels.

Regarding this assertion, Sun Liang (2008) emphasized that although Marx had indeed "terminated" the traditional "speculative philosophy", he did not stop there. Instead, he expressed a forward-looking theoretical longing for a new form of philosophy—that is, to promote the fundamental transformation of philosophy by establishing practical principles, and based on this, to construct a new worldview aimed at achieving "human liberation". This marks a profound transformation and clear direction for the development of the field of philosophy. You Zhaohe and his colleagues have generalized the object of Marx's criticism—"speculative philosophy"—to the viewpoint of "all philosophy", which clearly reveals a significant theoretical misunderstanding.

Sun Liang (2008) further elaborated that the "philosophy and science tainted by the 'original sin of speculation'" proposed by You Zhaohe are inherently opposed, and that "the materialist conception of history, as an empirical science of history, is fundamentally different from philosophy, historical philosophy or traditional ideology".

These arguments only have rationality in specific dimensions. For Marx, the concept of "empirical science" was actually a temporary term he used to define the boundaries between old and new philosophy and establish his unique identity as a theoretical system. Its inherent meaning oscillated between philosophical categories and scientific practice, presenting obvious uncertainty and complexity.

This argument precisely reveals how Marx, within his pioneering philosophical framework, consigned the traditional philosophical form, which has been closely intertwined with science since modern times, to the annals of history, marking the termination of the old philosophical system and the emergence of a new philosophical perspective. Under the framework of historical materialism, Marx deeply analyzed and criticized the limitations of the presuppositions existing in traditional philosophical thinking, thus revealing a new historical thinking mode centered on "history", which not only subverted the existing philosophical system but also bred an unprecedented philosophical paradigm.

In fact, the difference between “speculative philosophy” and traditional “philosophy” contains profound theoretical value. This distinction is inherently consistent with Sun Liang’s emphasis on Marx’s view on the construction of the new philosophical system, the construction of the Marxist materialist conception of history, and the termination of the general concept of “philosophy” mentioned by You Zhaohe (Sun, 2008). The focus of exploring the topic of “termination” is not limited to the traditional pure speculative philosophy represented by Hegel, but more importantly, it involves a fundamental subversion and reconstruction of the old worldview by a new worldview based on practical epistemology and dialectics. This transformation not only reshapes the paradigm of philosophy but also promotes the birth and development of a new philosophical system in its universal sense.

Fang Wen (2011) questioned this argument: since 1845, Marx’s philosophical thought has evolved into the so-called “anti-philosophical stage”. The so-called “anti-philosophical period” refers to a phase in Marx’s ideological evolution where he clearly rejected traditional philosophy, actively abandoned using the term “philosophy” to define his theoretical system, and deviated from the theoretical foundation of traditional speculative philosophy.

He firmly opposes analyzing and responding to practical problems based on the principles of traditional speculative philosophy, emphasizing that objective facts should be taken as the starting point, and that understanding and cognition of the real world should be constructed through empirical scientific research methods.

Fang Wen (2011) made an in-depth analysis of Marx’s famous statement in *Theses on Feuerbach*: “Philosophers only interpret the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” This statement not only profoundly reveals the inherent opposition between “interpreting the world” and “changing the world” but also embodies Marx’s anti-philosophical concept. (Marx & Engels, 1995a: 57)

In this discourse, Marx clearly positioned himself as an existence that transcends the category of “philosophers”. He not only did not compete with traditional “philosophers” as an “innovator”, but also faced and criticized “philosophers” as “non-philosophers”, and the latter became the core target of Marx’s theoretical construction.

Fang Wen (2011) pointed out that Sun Liang failed to make an in-depth analysis of the evolutionary process of Marx’s thought from a Marxist historical perspective, particularly ignoring Marx’s so-called “anti-philosophical period”, and thus mistakenly equated Marx’s ideological system with Marxism. This view is inaccurate and biased in academia.

In fact, the theoretical foundation for the dichotomy between “new-philosophers” and “old-philosophers”, as well as between “philosophers” and “non-philosophers”, is rather weak. On the one hand, the article fails to clearly define the essential characteristics of the role of “philosopher” that Marx denies, and thus fails to clearly indicate whether this definition includes the new philosophical system constructed by Marx later; On the other hand, in cases where the definition of concepts is not precise enough, there is a clear overlap and confusion between these identity labels, leading to blurred conceptual boundaries and posing a challenge to the logical rigor and scientific validity of the argument.

From the perspective of historical materialism based on Marxism, the so-called “anti-philosophical period” actually marks a key preparatory stage for Marx to deeply analyze the core of philosophy, systematically criticize existing philosophical frameworks, and actively explore innovative paths in philosophy. Merely analyzing Marx’s stance on philosophy to divide his ideological evolution trajectory, while ignoring the inherent unity and comprehensiveness of his ideological system, is undoubtedly a narrow perspective.

On this basis, the object of Engels’ concept of “termination”—the traditional purely speculative philosophical system that reached the culmination of traditional philosophy, namely Hegelian philosophy—has become the core focus of academic inquiry. This rigid philosophical paradigm will eventually be surpassed and reconstructed by a Marxist

innovative philosophical framework based on a practical perspective. This process of change does not mean the negation of the entire philosophical field; otherwise, the legitimacy foundation of the new philosophical system established by Marx and Engels will be questioned.

### 3 The Genealogical Connection between Feuerbach's Philosophy and Classical German Philosophy

Lenin emphasized in his work *The Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism* that “he enriched philosophy with the achievements of classical German philosophy, especially the Hegelian system—a system that further inspired Feuerbach’s materialism” (cited in Yang, 2024: 324).

Although Lenin did not elaborate on the representative figures of classical German philosophy in detail, he clearly regarded Hegel and Feuerbach as important representatives in this field. He emphasized their pivotal role in the development of classical German philosophy. This insight has exerted a far-reaching influence on the academic circles of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China, significantly shaping the ideological context and academic development direction of these regions.

Most philosophical dictionaries and works, such as *A History of Philosophy* edited by Duncker et al. (a volume of *History of European Philosophy*, published by People’s Publishing House in 1972) and *A New Inquiry into Classical German Philosophy* edited by Aleksandr Gulyga (published by China Social Sciences Press in 1993), also hold this view, considering Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Feuerbach as core representatives in the field of classical German philosophy.

The construction of this argument is essentially based on the perspective of “ideological inheritance context” to define the category of classical German philosophy. This perspective emphasizes that Feuerbach’s materialism not only inherits the essence of Hegelian philosophy but also innovatively transforms it, thereby stimulating the birth and development of Marxist philosophy and classifying it as a part of classical German philosophy. This classification criterion ignores the essential attribute of classical German philosophy, which is its traditional philosophical system characterized by a priori speculation and systematic construction.

Based on Kant’s pioneering theory of “a priori philosophy”, followed by Fichte’s profound exploration of subject agency, and Schelling’s unique exploration of the intrinsic connection between nature and human consciousness, until Hegel constructed an all encompassing dialectical philosophical system through the concept of “absolute spirit”, the core issue of classical German philosophy has always revolved around “rational self movement”, thus developing a self-contained tradition of speculative philosophy. Feuerbach’s philosophical thought takes humanism as its core, emphasizing the importance of sensory intuition and criticizing the speculative and abstract nature of Hegel’s philosophical system. This position and methodology actually mark a fundamental break from the speculative tradition of classical German philosophy.

In his book *Dialectics of Nature*, Engels explored the three major forms of dialectics and explicitly stated: “The second form of dialectics is precisely the one most familiar to German natural scientists, namely classical German philosophy from Kant to Hegel.” (Marx & Engels, 1995b: 287) In the book *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, he further deepened this viewpoint when discussing Hegelian philosophy, stating:

“Hegelian philosophy (here we are limited to examining this philosophy as the completion of the entire movement since Kant).”(Engels, 2018: 9) This conclusion reveals that within Engels’ theoretical framework, the category of classical German philosophy corresponds strictly to the philosophical evolutionary sequence from Kant to Hegel, with Hegel regarded as the culmination of this philosophical process—Feuerbach, by contrast, is not included in this classical philosophical lineage. The standard established by Engels particularly focuses on the “consistency of philosophical forms”. Specifically, he regards classical German philosophy as a unified and systematic dialectical philosophical framework, whose historical destination lies in the comprehensive presentation and deepening of Hegelian philosophy.

Although Feuerbach’s philosophical thought originated from the Hegelian system, it has transcended the boundaries of pure speculation and focused on exploring individual and sensory practical activities in reality, thus belonging to the category of “modern German philosophy”, which presents significant differences from traditional classical German philosophy.

The book *The German Ideology* provides crucial textual evidence and strongly supports this argument. Marx and Engels jointly completed this work from the autumn of 1845 to May 1846. Subsequently, in 1847, Marx officially established the complete title for it in his work *Refutation of Karl Grün—German Ideology: A Critique of Modern German Philosophy Represented by Feuerbach, Bauer, and Stirner, and Various Prophetic German Socialism*.

Under this title setting, Marx clearly positioned Feuerbach as an iconic figure of modern German philosophy, explicitly excluding his identity as a representative of classical German philosophy, and denying the view that Feuerbach was the one who brought the classical German philosophical tradition to an end.

As Marx and Engels explained in their book *The Holy Family*, they explicitly pointed out that Feuerbach marked the end of classical German philosophy, and this statement profoundly revealed the stage transformation of philosophical development (Marx & Engels, 1957).

They emphasized that Feuerbach fundamentally eliminated the multiple differences between spiritualism and materialism in theory, and comprehensively analyzed and criticized it from a profound internal perspective of Hegelian philosophy. Based on the analysis of the specific document, *The Holy Family*, the frequent use of phrases such as “elimination,” “eternal overcoming,” and “termination and criticism” does indeed present a textual image of “termination”, which seems to imply that Feuerbach has completed a systematic subversion and transcendence of the classical German philosophical system.

However, if this viewpoint is analyzed in depth within the comprehensive logical framework constructed by the classic works of Marx and Engels, it can be concluded that it does not actually reflect Engels’ ultimate theoretical position. The book *The Holy Family* was born in 1845, at a critical moment when Marx and Engels were in the process of forming a materialist view of history and transforming their philosophical circles. At this time, they had not yet completely freed themselves from Feuerbach’s humanistic constraints, and therefore, their evaluation of Feuerbach had not achieved a comprehensive and fair analysis.

In the work *The Holy Family*, Marx’s role is more often portrayed as the successor and even a student of Feuerbach’s ideas, and his discourse often follows Feuerbach’s perspective and arguments. The viewpoint of Marx and Engels’ in-depth theoretical reflection and “clearing up” and revision is obviously not sufficient as a reasonable basis for positioning Feuerbach as the one who brought classical German philosophy to an end.

Only when the dialectical materialism and historical materialism of Marx and Engels mature can their evaluation of Feuerbach have theoretical legitimacy and validity. Based on this, under the theoretical framework of Marx and Engels,

Feuerbach is not a typical representative of classical German philosophy, and the development trajectory of classical German philosophy came to an end after Hegel.

## 4 The “Termination” of the Old Philosophy and the Prospects for a New Philosophy

Engels emphasized that: “A great theoretical system like Hegel’s philosophy, which has exerted a profound influence on the spiritual development of the nation, cannot be negated by mere neglect. It must be ‘sublated’ in its original sense; namely, its form must be subjected to critical negation.”(Engels, 2018: 16)

Here, Engels’ criticism of the methodological stance of “ignoring” specifically refers to Feuerbach’s attitude towards Hegelian philosophy—that is, he failed to deeply analyze and creatively transform it, but simply accepted its basic framework without critical reconstruction and transcendence. If, as some scholars argue, Feuerbach is actually the one who brought classical German philosophy to an end, Engels does not need to discuss this, thus revealing that the role of the “terminator” in achieving complete transcendence and innovation of the traditional philosophical system does not belong to Feuerbach.

In fact, both Hegel and Feuerbach carried the ideal of subverting the traditional philosophical system, but failed to accomplish this historically significant task; It is Marxist philosophy that has truly achieved fundamental changes in the old philosophical system.

The development of natural sciences has shifted from the empirical stage of material collection to the theoretical stage of material systematization. Traditional natural philosophy is no longer able to respond to the demands of social progress generated by the development of modern science. It is necessary to integrate the natural world into the historical process for a holistic and comprehensive understanding.

The core of this perspective is to reveal and grasp the general laws of movement in the history of human social development, so as to achieve a deep understanding and prediction of the relationship between nature and society. Compared to pure natural laws, social and historical laws exhibit more complex characteristics, mainly due to the fact that although the social and historical field has a certain degree of natural attributes, the forces driving the historical process include contingency and human intervention, which together constitute the unique complexity of social and historical evolution.

Based on this understanding, Engels elaborated on the essential characteristics of the materialist view of history through rich historical facts, and deeply insight into the direction of philosophical evolution: on the one hand, the exploration of pure philosophy will focus on the in-depth analysis of logic and dialectics; On the other hand, once pure philosophy is detached from the fields of nature and history, ignoring the metaphysical views of scientific progress and social change, it will inevitably be limited to the legacy ideas of classical German philosophy. The study of natural science and social history, which truly reflects the spirit of the times, should become the core content of historical science research, including new philosophy.

Chen Xianda’s (2006) view is consistent with this; he clearly states: “The establishment of Marxist philosophy marks the historical demise of the old philosophy as the ‘science of sciences’, yet philosophy still exists as a worldview and truly fulfills its role.”

You Zhaohe further pointed out that the place of philosophy’s existence mainly focuses on two categories:

“worldview” and “logic”. However, with the development of science, these two fields will gradually exclude philosophy, ultimately leading to the complete exclusion of philosophy. At the same time, he emphasized that Marx and Engels made a precise conceptual distinction between “worldview” and “philosophy”, calling themselves “communist worldview” and “new materialism”, without adopting the expression form of “Marxist philosophy”.

For this argument, Gao Dehai and Sun Litian (2003) proposed a perspective that is more in line with the context of social development. They emphasized that the essential meaning of the termination of philosophy lies in the historical disappearance of the dominant position of philosophical thought, that is, the disappearance of Western traditional philosophy’s way of dominating the world through its ideas, especially the cognitive model that focuses on capturing pure ideas through speculative means.

This viewpoint reveals the changes in the power structure within the field of philosophy and its impact on knowledge production, while also touching upon the fundamental transformation of the relationship between philosophy and modern society. The concept of comprehensive human development still emphasizes the importance of the key dimension of “theoretical thinking ability”. Even though traditional philosophical forms are no longer dominant, philosophy still retains its indispensable value and significance.

Therefore, the future development of philosophy revealed by Engels presents a dual trend: on the one hand, logic and dialectics, as research paradigms in the pure field of thought, are preserved and developed, deepening our understanding of abstract thinking; On the other hand, emerging philosophy is guided by a new worldview, and its research focus has shifted from pure theoretical thinking to the social and historical processes of reality, thus forming a new philosophical system that integrates practice and criticism, and when the exploration perspective.

When the exploration perspective of philosophy shifts from abstract theoretical thinking to practical social practice, its inherent critical and transformative potential can be fully demonstrated, marking the true termination of the traditional speculative philosophical system and thus opening a new era in the history of philosophical development.

## 5 Summary

As a representative work of Marxist philosophy, the work comprehensively analyzes the historical link between Marxist philosophy and classical German philosophy, deeply analyzes the basic principles of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and significantly reveals the significant reforms that Marxist philosophy has brought to the entire field of philosophy. Throughout this work, the keyword “termination” runs through the entire analysis, epitomizing the decline and residual influence of the old philosophical framework, and uncovering the formation process and internal logic of the new emerging philosophical system.

It not only demonstrates Marx’s profound criticism and innovative inheritance of classical German philosophy, but also highlights the spiritual core of continuous development and change contained in his theoretical system. The new philosophical system carries a new worldview that overturns the traditional thinking mode of pure speculation, actively advocates and integrates practical theory and realistic research methods, and deeply explores and integrates into various aspects of human social life, thus outlining a scientific and reasonable direction for the future development of the philosophical field.

In the contemporary era, rethinking the philosophical issue of termination discussed in the work can deepen our understanding of the essential transformation of Marxist philosophy, prevent it from falling into rigid and closed

systematic dogmas, and highlight its inherent critical and revolutionary spirit. This process not only helps to grasp the core values of Marxist philosophy but also provides theoretical references for other philosophical schools, promoting the integration and development of diverse ideas.

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