Abstract:
Under the background of showrooming effect consumers adopt theoffline experience and online shopping, which leads to the conflict of online andoffline channels. To alleviate the effect, the manufacturer designs the contractto incentive the retailer. The service quality cost contract and optimal dynamicquality decision are investigated. The result indicates that the goodwill, benefitsof members in centralized model are better than that in decentralized model.In decentralized model the service quality and goodwill are decreasing withthe increasing showrooming effect. The cost sharing contract can alleviate thenegative effect of showrooming effect on the goodwill. Finally, the contract canenhance the service quality of the retailer.
展厅效应下消费者选择先线下体验后线上购买的消费方式,从而加剧线下零售商与线上销售商之间的渠道冲突。为了降低渠道冲突,制造企业加强与零售商合作,同时设计相应的契约激励零售商。论文设计了制造商对零售商服务质量成本分担契约,研究了展厅现象下供应链成员的最优动态质量决策。研究结果表明,集中决策下的服务质量、企业商誉和供应链成员收益优于分散决策。分散决策情形下,零售商的服务质量水平、企业商誉都会随着展厅效应的增强而下降。成本分担契约可以缓解展厅效应对商誉的不利影响,提升了零售商提高服务质量的积极性。