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1 Introduction

Technofeudalism is one of the core issues discussed by Western scholars regarding the new changes in digital capitalism. Its central argument holds that the capitalist mode of production no longer plays a dominant role in today’s digital society; instead, digital platforms and the rent model have taken the leading position. Western scholars such as Yanis Varoufakis, Cédric Durand, and Jodi Dean, as the main representatives, have attempted to define the new changes in the relationships between platforms, merchants, and users through the lens of feudal social relations. They believe that “cloud rent” is gradually replacing the traditional capitalist exploitation of labor, revealing a new form of hegemony and dependency amid the booming development of digital technology. At present, academic research on technofeudalism has formed a preliminary holistic understanding, which has pointed out the basic theoretical stance for subsequent studies on the topic of technofeudalism. Technofeudalism is a product of the self-alienation and escalating contradictions of capitalism (Li, & Wu, 2025), an extension of capitalist production relations (Pan, & Cheng, 2025), and a result of the differential reproduction of capitalism, rather than a revival of feudalism (Xue, 2025). Its essence is a new form of the usurious and parasitic nature of monopoly capitalism (Chen, 2025), and a self-adjustment of capitalism to adapt to digital technology. Based on this, this paper presents the manifestations and generative logic of technofeudalism, and preliminarily explores whether “cloud rent” has broken away from capitalist production relations, and whether a relationship of dependency and domination has been formed between “cloud serfs” and “cloud lords”.

2 The Manifestations of Technofeudalism

2.1 Role Transformation: “Cloud Lords” “Cloud Serfs” “Cloud Fiefdoms”

Proponents of the theory of technofeudalism argue that workers and users rely on digital platforms for their survival, forming social relations that are identical to those of feudalism. The proposition of technofeudalism includes the core concepts of “cloud lords”, “cloud fiefdoms” and “cloud serfs”, and the relationship among the three represents new changes in the era of digital capitalism.

The “cloud lords” exercise data control and algorithmic discipline over users by virtue of their ownership of digital platforms, forming the “new ruling class” in the era of the digital economy. Merchants entering the platform can only access the “cloud territory” with permission, and the communicative activities of ‘cloud serfs’ inevitably occur on digital platforms, generating data trails. “Cloud lords” privatize data resources and maintain their monopoly position. In their digital fiefdoms, “cloud lords” are responsible for algorithmic security and collecting payments. Proponents of the theory of technofeudalism argue that this is no different from the behavior of feudal lords who authorized the development of their fiefdoms and maintained security. Today, the CEO of Amazon authorizes suppliers to operate on its “digital fiefdoms”, while Amazon itself is responsible for supervision and payment collection. TikTok charges rent to hosts who use its platform. Tech giants have transformed into feudal lord-like rentiers in the era of digital capitalism.

“Cloud serfs” is a term used by proponents of the theory of technofeudalism to define digital platform laborers and users. Users who contribute digital resources to the platform are the main representatives of “cloud serfs”, as they create data resources for “cloud lords” through unpaid audience labor. Generally speaking, “cloud serfs” are individuals who do not belong to any company and freely replicate the stock of cloud capital. These individuals post messages, photos, and generate a large number of clicks on the platform, continuously making the digital platform more attractive to users and potential users. “Cloud lords” control data property rights and collect the data produced by “cloud serfs” on the platform, relying on algorithms to form automated social control and the long-term dependence of “cloud serfs” on digital platforms.

“Cloud Fiefdoms” (originally referred to as “Cloud Enclosure”) is an algorithm-driven technological platform facilitating daily transactions and interactions, and its essence is digital land controlled by tech giants. In the era of digital capitalism, digital virtual land serves as a means of production. Proponents of the theory of technofeudalism believe that it has similar properties to land in the feudal era. “Cloud Lords”, as managers of digital territories, hold the algorithmic control over digital platforms. For the “cloud serfs” who use digital platforms, these platforms have realized the digital construction of real-life spaces. People can be matched with sellers through algorithms on digital platforms, and unconsciously contribute data without remuneration.

2.2 Absolute Control: New Changes in Social Production of Digital Platforms

The involvement of digital platforms in social production is mainly reflected in algorithmic control and economic control. Tech giants control the distribution and exchange of goods by establishing technical architectures, realizing dual jurisdiction of algorithms and economy within digital platforms. Proponents of technofeudalism argue that it is precisely because tech giants master technology and control the economy that a social relationship similar to that between feudal lords and serfs has been formed.

The intervention of digital platforms in social production has led to oligopolies in the market, resulting in an imbalance of power between platforms and users. Large digital platforms control the online activities of commodity producers, content providers, and consumers, and by virtue of their monopolistic market position, they exploit all elements that are beneficial to their development. First, controlling user attention is conducive to gathering platform users. In the digital age, the core of algorithms and artificial intelligence is to design and optimize attention allocation mechanisms. Every advancement in technology means a deepening of capital erosion, as capital shapes the structure of attention through digital technology. People’s attention has shifted from the real physical space to the digital space. Digital platforms push “personalized” and “exciting content” to users, attracting them to use the platforms and creating a huge user base within the platforms. Second, the platform’s monopoly on user traffic has formed an oligopolistic monopoly in the digital platform market. Digital platforms boast a massive user base; for instance, Amazon has hundreds of millions of active users and paid members. If merchants leave the digital platform, it means losing a large number of online buyers. In order to further consolidate their monopolistic market position, digital platforms are interested in isolating competitors and enclosing themselves in independent digital ecosystems, thereby forming a market monopoly. They wield algorithms as a “quasi-visible hand” in market transactions, leading to the failure of the market price mechanism. They control prices to deviate from market supply and demand, and use dynamic pricing algorithms to maximize platform profits. Finally, platform algorithms dominate the distribution and exchange of commodities within digital platforms, creating an unequal pattern between users and digital platforms. For industrial capitalists, accelerating the efficiency of commodity turnover is an inevitable choice for capital appreciation, and any strategy that helps accelerate commodity turnover is desirable. Digital platforms have increased the turnover rate of commodities through precise advertising and breaking geographical boundaries. The acceleration of commodity turnover by digital platforms has brought excess profits to merchants, thereby gaining the power to charge merchants a portion of these huge profits. Marx pointed out, “If the conditions that enable him to accelerate the turnover of capital are themselves purchasable, such as the location of a shop, then he has to pay an additional rent, that is, convert part of his excess profit into ground rent.” (Marx, & Engels, 2009a: 350) The “shop location” within digital platforms is determined by algorithmic recommendations. Tech giants classify shops through strategies such as ratings, grades, and rankings formulated by algorithms. When users purchase goods on digital platforms, the platforms organize and make recommendations through algorithms based on the collected user data, control list rankings, and accurately push potential buyers, thereby increasing the platform’s exposure of commodities and implicitly guiding users to make selective consumption. It can be seen that with the emergence of digital platforms, the new changes in social production are reflected in algorithmic control and market control.

2.3 Special Form: “Cloud Rent” and Data Value Harvesting

The core of exploitation in technofeudalism lies in “cloud rent”. The basic forms of this predatory exploitation are profit sharing from platform merchants, subscription-based charges, and data value harvesting from users. The first two are the direct ways for tech giants to obtain profits, while the latter is a more hidden form of exploitation by capitalists against laborers.

Ground rent is the surplus value paid by land users to landowners that exceeds the average profit. It is not a natural product but land capital—the product after transformation. The emergence of “cloud rent” is the usage rent of digital platforms generated by capital intervening in digital land. In capital-dominated digital technology platforms, tech giants charge rent to merchants based on their monopoly position over digital platforms. The issue of cloud rent on digital technology platforms is also part of the surplus value that digital platforms obtain from merchants beyond the average profit. Tech giants collect part of the profit in the special form of “cloud rent”, which means that merchants have to pay a certain fee to enter the digital platform, and this part of the profit is taken from the merchants. As the formal coat woven by algorithms, data platforms enable tech giants to reduce their participation in direct exploitation and gradually detach themselves from the production process.

User behavior data is a production factor that generates profits, and tapping into its value can achieve value harvesting. The “fruits” borne by digital fiefdoms cover everything that can be digitized. These data resources are not created consciously by users. Still, they are unconscious traces left by users in their activities on digital platforms, such as usage data of digital users’ connected devices, online transaction records and interactions, location data, user application usage records, web browsing data, etc. In the stage of data capitalization, users’ online activities are essentially digital labor with the nature of productive labor (Chen, & Sun, 2023). The data left by users when registering and accessing digital platforms is a digital virtual representation of their real lives. Tech giants capture and integrate data from digital platforms to accurately outline users’ profiles and consumption habits (Zhang, & Zhang, 2025), and use systematic technical means to convert data resources into data assets with commercial value. For example, platforms rate users’ loans through credit scores and accurately deliver products to potential buyers to accelerate capital turnover efficiency and generate more profits.

3 The Generative Logic of Technofeudalism

3.1 Logical Starting Point: digital territorial division in Digital Space

With the continuous shaping of capitalist production space by digital technology, digital capital is generating digital territorial division in the digital space under the logic of capital. By controlling digital technology, tech giants maximize capital accumulation within their digital platforms. This is manifested in their dominance over digital hardware and software through the “digital fiefdom” model, leading to an oligopolistic market in the digital space analogous to feudal separatism.

The digital space is an extension of human beings’ real production and living space. Humans build digital platforms with the help of digital technologies, forming new fields in the digital space through transaction and communication activities. Ubiquitous digitization, like other infrastructure, will bring fundamental changes to society. Texts, sounds and images in real life can be processed into data, constantly forming “user-generated content”. Tech giants collect the data resources continuously generated within digital platforms and expand their own digital territorial space through mergers, holdings or agreements, so that the data resources they possess are more complete, thereby blocking competitors from obtaining relevant data.

The market oligopoly of tech giants manifests as the digital territorial division of digital space. It is these tech giants, such as Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon, that own digital platforms and provide users with platform-derived products and services. By monopolizing user data, digital technology infrastructure, and algorithms, they form a market oligopoly with a high concentration of means of production. Proponents of the theory of technofeudalism argue that the exclusive control of means of production by tech giants has evolved into a form of digital territorial division similar to that of feudal lords. With the support of digital technology, digital capital has given rise to a “digital fiefdom” system, where tech giants become “cloud lords”, and users and merchants sign digital contracts with them, thus turning into “cloud serfs”. Tech giants divide market domains according to platform service items and establish a series of systems to consolidate their market position in the digital space. Tech giants of different platforms divide the digital space into different fields. For example, Google Maps in the West provides online navigation services, and Microsoft offers Office document editing services. Digital space is being divided into functional, relatively independent and closed
domains.

3.2 Logical Intermediary: Platform Monopoly and Private Ownership of Data

Tech giants guide users to sign “service terms agreements” to obtain access rights and ownership of user data, realizing the private ownership of data within the platform scope. Tech giants have almost no marginal cost in collecting data within their digital territories, and the ease of data collection is proportional to the size of the platform. Relying on the oligopolistic position of digital platforms in the market, tech giants, while collecting scarce digital resources, continuously extract data from platform users and bring new data traffic, continuously accumulating massive amounts of data to achieve digital capital accumulation, resulting in the feudalistic attachment of “cloud serfs” to “cloud territories” as described by theorists of technofeudalism.

The scarcity of high-quality data acquisition and processing has created an infinite desire among tech giants to acquire platform data. Data has the characteristic of non-consumability, and can be regenerated and copied at low cost. However, the acquisition and processing of data are scarce. The scarcity of high-quality data acquisition and processing is mainly reflected in the difficulty in obtaining high-quality data and its exclusivity. “Just as oil wells do not yield an endless supply of petroleum, the data generated by the activities of individuals and organizations is not inexhaustible and cannot be captured indefinitely. The same holds for the capacity to capture our attention. Therefore, raw data is characterized by absolute scarcity.” (Durand, 2024: 21) Data itself does not generate profits; instead, it only becomes a tool for capital appreciation under the conditions of digital platform private ownership. Specifically, profits are not generated when data is transmitted from one user’s device to another’s (Lan, 2024: 200); only when data is privatized and processed by the platform, and when dealing with a large amount of rapidly flowing data, with the highest profits and efficiency, will data attract people’s attention and thereby generate profits.

As a new-type factor of production in the era of the digital economy, data is created by platform users yet owned by capitalists, standing alongside traditional factors of production on an equal footing (Zhang, & He, 2025). Drawing on the user data they acquire, “Cloud Lords” develop personalized intelligent recommendation services; for instance, shopping software displays tailored advertisements in sections such as “Recommended for You” and “You May Also Need”. The finer the granularity of user data captured by digital platforms, the higher the degree of dependence of “Cloud Serfs” on these platforms—a state of reliance that takes shape amid the process of platform monopoly over data. The data and algorithms monopolized by tech giants have replaced price signals in transactions, and “data-rich markets will ultimately achieve what markets are theoretically supposed to do—realizing optimal transactions” (Durand, 2024: 173). The profit-driven nature of capital is precisely satisfied in such optimal transactions. Leveraging their monopolistic position on digital platforms, “Cloud Lords” manipulate commodity prices, while users unconsciously develop behavioral habits of online consumption. As digital platforms and their users become inextricably intertwined, this so-called “dependency status” of users on digital platforms undermines market competition, leaving tech giants only needing to maintain their monopolistic position in the digital platform market. Even some emerging tech firms, after gaining a certain volume of data traffic, wait to be merged or acquired by tech giants, further exacerbating the latter’s market monopoly in the industry.

3.3 Logical Reconstruction: The Digital Rebirth of “Cloud Lords” and “Cloud Serfs”

Under the dominance of the logic of capital in digital platforms, the collusion between digital capital and digital technology has triggered in-depth reflections by Western scholars on the changes in contemporary capitalism. Proponents of techno-feudalism attempt to explore the power structure relations hidden behind the relations of production, and define the phenomenon of oligopoly in today’s digital capitalism with the hypothesis of techno-feudalism.

Against the backdrop of the new technological revolution, tech giants have established economic exploitation relationships similar to those in the feudal era through technological monopoly and data control. In terms of production relations, tech giants are shaping a new social form through predatory exploitation by collecting “cloud rent”, and this social order is in some ways more similar to a feudal structure. It is evident that proponents of techno-feudalism attempt to reconstruct the production relations of the digital capitalist era using feudal social relations, believing that contemporary capitalist society is undergoing qualitative changes. The digital platforms controlled by tech giants are not neutral, and the captured data carries social biases and dominance relations. With the help of algorithms, digital platforms enhance the predictability of users’ behaviors to achieve market positioning. When users browse products online, the products recommended by digital platforms seem to understand their needs better than the users themselves. People leave massive amounts of data in the digital virtual world, and the user data plundered by digital platforms is called “the crystallization of social surplus in the cloud”. These cloud data themselves are the “crystallization” of collective collaboration, continuously generated in people’s online interactions. With the support of algorithms, data is further processed to become a means for digital platforms to enhance the accuracy of algorithmic recommendations. “The crystallization of social surplus in the cloud permeates personal life, just as serfs were once bound to the land within the lord’s sphere of influence.” (Durand, 2024: 111) Relying on their monopoly position, digital platforms exercise comprehensive control over production, circulation, and even social rules, “controlling the space for observing and capturing data on human activities” (Durand, 2024: 80), thereby giving rise to a new power structure of “cloud lords” and “cloud serfs”.

4 A Critical Examination of the Phenomenon of Technofeudalism

4.1 “Cloud Rent” Has Not Escaped Capitalist Production Relations

The phenomenon reflected by technofeudalism is a new form of digital capitalism. “Cloud rent” reflects the change in the way the bourgeoisie seizes profits, as tech giants cover up the exploitation of wage labor with a more hidden form of exploitation.

Traditional industrial capitalists directly employ and exploit workers, appropriating workers’ surplus labor time without compensation, and satisfying capital’s infinite greed for surplus value by constantly extending workers’ surplus labor time. Tech giants that include elements of wage labor still exploit workers, and their exploitation of labor also takes the form of extending surplus labor time. Tech companies even monitor workers remotely online, forcing workers to work at a high intensity during their necessary labor time. As Cédric Durand put it: “Although the exploitation of labor power still plays a central role in the formation of global surplus value, the particularity of the current situation lies in capital’s use of capture mechanisms.” (Durand, 2024: 117) Relying on their monopoly over data resources and digital technologies, tech giants charge “cloud rent” to users and merchants on digital platforms. In the eyes of proponents of the theory of techno-feudalism, this predatory exploitation is seen as a shift away from the labor exploitation model of industrial capitalists to a feudal rent model of collecting rent.

In essence, “cloud rent” is the use value provided by the derivative services of digital platforms. Digital platforms can offer users services such as online shopping and social interaction. “Cloud rent” should be regarded as a transaction between users and platform services, and it still falls within the scope of capitalist commodity transactions. Tech giants collect sales commissions or rents, creating the illusion that digital platforms can generate profits independently. In fact, tech giants are redistributing market profits by virtue of their monopoly position. Yannis Varoufakis believes that “capitalist profits are disappearing, and new forms of rent are accumulating in the accounts of the new technological lords who control the state and digital territories” (Varoufakis, & Morozov, 2022). On the contrary, capitalist profits have not disappeared, and the profits accumulated by the “new feudal lords” are still surplus value. Within the bourgeoisie, a bourgeois stratum that holds digital platforms and is at the top has emerged, while other bourgeois and petty bourgeois are exploited by the rent they collect. Industrial capitalists cede part of their surplus value to digital platforms, and tech giants participate in the profit distribution of capitalist social production, making the situation of social class struggle more complex.

Furthermore, digital platforms that generate “cloud rent”, as infrastructure, always exist in the form of constant capital in the capitalist production process. Compared with machines that depreciate continuously, digital platforms do not have the problem of depreciation during use. Due to the endogenous characteristic of self-evolution in data collection, platforms use user behavior data to train algorithms, which maximally blurs the boundary between labor and entertainment for digital platform users. The means of predicting and even correcting users promote more online transactions, achieving the ultimate goal of extracting more “cloud rent”. From this perspective, the emergence of “cloud rent” does not mean the elimination of capitalist exploitation; instead, it means that tech giants exploit users more covertly. Users’ activities on various digital platforms are constructing their own digital portraits, and they are gratuitously training digital algorithms to develop in a more accurate, effective, and beneficial direction, enabling platform capital to grow increasingly stronger.

4.2 Platform dependence cannot be equated with feudal dependence

The basic characteristic of technofeudalism is the new change of digital capitalism. The social relations composed of “cloud serfs”, “cloud fiefdoms” and “cloud lords” are essentially different from those of feudalism. The personal dependency relationship in feudalism is different from the platform dependency relationship in the era of digital capitalism. The dependence of “cloud serfs” on digital platforms is a product of the relations of production in the capitalist era.

In the era of digital capitalism, platform dependency manifests as a strong binding relationship between algorithms and users. Tech giants bind online users through means such as data collection and processing, recommendation algorithms, advertising algorithms, and user behavior analysis. People rely on digital platforms in real life and leave massive amounts of data in the digital world. These cloud-based data are constantly generated in people’s online interactions, yet they make people increasingly dependent on technology platforms. There are content differences between different digital platforms, which impose high-cost soft constraints on users who switch platforms, but users can never escape algorithmic dependence.

“Digital platforms are the new water mills, billionaires are the new lords, and thousands of workers and billions of users are the new serfs.” (Žižek, 2021) Water mills were production platforms in the handicraft production stage. In today’s digital information age, tech giants with huge wealth own digital platforms as new production tools, and platform users seem to have become “cloud serfs” attached to the digital land. On the one hand, the dependency of “cloud serfs” on digital platforms is a product of market exchange relations. Under the control of platform algorithms, “cloud serfs” exchange their online activities, such as platform clicks and traffic, for platform services, resulting in a dependency on digital platforms. “Cloud lords” collect rents from merchants and grant them the right to operate, while users contribute behavioral data to obtain the opportunity to use the platform. This dependency manifests as an exchange relationship within the scope of data platforms. On the other hand, feudal dependency relations originated from the private monopoly of land resources. In feudal society, fiefs were the reason for vassals’ loyalty and service, and the two were connected through feudal land contracts (Ganshof, 2016), and serfs could not unilaterally terminate feudal land contracts. The personal dependency in feudalism was reflected in serfs’ attachment to the fiefs of vassals, which manifested as the direct deprivation of the personal freedom of agricultural laborers and the obedience and subordination of the majority to the minority. It can be seen that the dependency of “cloud serfs” and merchants on digital platforms is different from the personal dependency in feudal society; the two only have formal similarities.

Essentially, whether it is a digital platform or a platform algorithm, they all exist dependent on capital. The oligopoly of digital platforms does not mean the return of feudalism. Digital platforms realize their own capital accumulation by occupying data and digital labor. As a product of the coupling of capital and digital technology, digital platforms cannot escape the fate of being controlled by capital power, and the logic of capital accumulation always governs the operation of digital platforms. Tech giants employ labor to carry out program operation and algorithm support of digital platforms, and this kind of digital labor is purposeful and productive (Wang, 2025). In this sense, tech giants seize the results of digital labor, further monopolize user data, and conduct algorithmic panoptic monitoring of platform users. In essence, they are capitalists rather than “cloud lords”. In terms of the nature of digital platforms, they are the product of human technological innovation. The phenomenon of digital platform algorithms controlling users also has its root in the capitalist application of digital technology. Marx believed that technology is a real productive force, and the negative effects of technology are the result of the capitalist application of technology. “In the handicraft workshop, workers use tools; in the factory, workers serve machines (Marx, & Engels, 2009b: 486).” This reversed state of humans and things is reproduced between platforms and users. It is not users who dominate platform algorithms, but platform algorithms that dominate users under the law of exchange value.

5 Conclusion

The rapid multiplication and expansion of platform capital have gradually evolved into a social phenomenon where tech giants hold substantial power like feudal lords. In fact, as an advanced stage of digital capitalism, technofeudalism points to social phenomena such as “cloud rent” replacing capital profits and personal dependence on digital platforms. However, this does not indicate that digital capitalism is being replaced by technofeudalism; instead, it still falls within the scope of capitalist production relations. “No matter how much an individual may subjectively strive to transcend these relationships, socially, he remains their product (Marx, & Engels, 2009b: 10).” Technofeudalism cannot accurately reflect the new changes in digital capitalism; ultimately, it is a product of the production relations of digital capitalism. With the rapid development of emerging technological fields such as digital technology and artificial intelligence, we should base ourselves on historical materialism to analyze the new changes in contemporary capitalist society and dispel the layers of fog shrouding digital capitalism.

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