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民事一审和解与调解纠纷解决机制：基于博弈理论的新思考

Civil First-instance Settlement and Mediation Dispute Resolution Mechanism: New Perspectives based on Game Theory

Progress in Social Sciences / 2025,7(1): 73-80 / 2025-02-19 85 173

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• Authors: 沈佳鑫     
• Information:

  上海政法学院，上海

• Keywords: Civil litigation; Settlement; Mediation; Game theory 民事诉讼；和解；调解；博弈理论
• Abstract: As pivotal mechanisms for dispute resolution in civil litigation, settlement and mediation effectively curtail the escalation of litigation, reduce litigation costs, achieve the resolution of conflicts at the preliminary stage and in substance, and facilitate the transformation and upgrading of social governance models. However, the doctrinal study of law presents certain limitations in the research of dispute resolution mechanisms. Therefore, aiming to promote the refinement of dispute resolution mechanisms and enhance the efficiency of reaching settlements and mediations, this paper seeks to transcend the limitations inherent in doctrinal legal studies by employing game theory as a methodological tool to explore the interactions and dynamic decision-making behaviors among multiple parties during the civil litigation process. The research finds that reducing the costs associated with settlements and mediations, narrowing the gap in the parties’ predictions of litigation outcomes, and refunding the case acceptance fees in mediation can promote the success of settlements and mediations in the first instance of civil cases. After partially amending this conclusion with the concept of the rule of law, and considering the actual judicial situation, the following recommendations are proposed: promoting the exchange of information between plaintiffs and defendants to form a correct consensus on the case; reducing the costs for parties in civil litigation to reach settlements and mediations; and refunding the case acceptance fees to the plaintiff without imposing them on the defendant when a case is concluded through mediation. 民事诉讼中的和解与调解作为解决纠纷的关键手段，能有效减少诉讼增量、降低诉讼成本，实现矛盾纠纷的前端化解和实质化解，促进社会治理模式的转型升级。但是，法教义学对纠纷解决机制的研究存在一定局限性。因此，本文以完善纠纷解决机制为目标，以提高和解与调解的达成效率为路径，突破法教义学的研究局限，运用博弈理论，探究民事诉讼过程中多主体间的互动与动态决策行为。研究发现降低和解调解成本、缩小当事人诉讼结果预测差距以及在调解中返还案件受理费能够促进民事一审中和解与调解的成功。利用法治理念对该结论进行部分修正后，结合司法实际情况提出以下建议：促进原被告的信息交换形成案件正确共识；降低民事诉讼当事人和解与调解的成本；当案件调解结案返还原告案件受理费用并无需被告承担。
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.35534/pss.0701014
• Cite: 沈佳鑫．民事一审和解与调解纠纷解决机制：基于博弈理论的新思考［J］．社会科学进展，2025，7（1）：73-80.