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特别表决权股东关联交易审查标准之构建

The Establishment of Review Standards for Connected Transactions Involving Shareholders with Special Voting Rights

余忠诚

Progress in Social Sciences / 2026,8(5): 383-388 / 2026-05-20 77 89

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• Information:

  上海政法学院，上海

• Keywords:
  Special voting rights; Fiduciary duties; Connected transactions
  特别表决权; 忠实义务; 关联交易
• Abstract: Under the current legal framework, connected transactions conducted by shareholders with special voting rights in a dual-class share structure may harm the interests of the company and ordinary shareholders, yet the review standards remain insufficient. Traditional review standards for connected transactions fail under the “one share, multiple votes” structure, as both the board of directors and the shareholders’ meeting are substantially controlled by shareholders with special voting rights. To address this dilemma, shareholders with special voting rights should bear fiduciary duties under the Company Law, requiring them to prioritize the overall interests of the company, ensure the substantive fairness of transactions, and avoid oppressing ordinary shareholders. Based on this, the review standards should be restructured as follows: before a major connected transaction is concluded, ordinary shareholders shall jointly engage an independent third-party institution to conduct a pre-assessment; if the transaction is challenged or the assessment is deemed unfair, an interim review by the shareholders’ meeting shall be initiated, adopting a “dual majority vote” standard. At the same time, different rules for the burden of proof should be established depending on whether the transaction has undergone shareholders’ meeting review, and it should be clarified that the business judgment rule does not apply to shareholders with special voting rights. The aim is to construct a new review mechanism that balances the restraint of power abuse with respect for control rights, and ensures the substantive fairness of transactions. 在现行法律下，双层股权结构下特别表决权股东进行关联交易可能损害公司及普通股东利益，而审查标准存在不足。传统关联交易审查标准在“一股多权”结构下失效，因董事会和股东会均被特别表决权股东实质控制。为解决此困境，特别表决权股东应承担《公司法》上的忠实义务，要求其首要考虑公司整体利益、确保交易实质公平、避免压迫普通股东。基于此重构审查标准：在重大关联交易达成前，由普通股东共同聘请独立第三方机构进行事前评估；若交易遭质疑或评估不公，则启动事中股东会审查，采取“双重多数决”标准。同时，区分是否经股东会审查设置不同的举证责任规则，并明确商事判断规则不适用于特别表决权股东。旨在构建兼顾制约滥权与尊重控制权、保障交易实质公平的新型审查机制。
• DOI: 10.35534/pss.0805067 (registering DOI)
• Cite: 余忠诚．特别表决权股东关联交易审查标准之构建［J］．社会科学进展，2026，8（5）：383-388.