International Open Access Journal Platform

转售价格维持的安全港制度适用研究

A Study on the Application of the Safe Harbor Regime to Resale Price Maintenance

刘云天

Progress in Social Sciences / 2026,8(7): 590-595 / 2026-07-10 16 13

View Download PDF

• Information:

  中国政法大学，北京

• Keywords:
  Resale price maintenance; Safe harbor regime; Competitive harm; Exemption clause
  转售价格维持; 安全港制度; 竞争损害; 豁免条款
• Abstract: In December 2025, the State Administration for Market Regulation revised the Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements, further specifying the market-share thresholds and supporting conditions under which vertical monopoly agreements may be exempted from prohibition. This revision brings resale price maintenance within the scope of the safe harbor regime. Such a regulatory design not only departs from the strict approach to resale price maintenance that China has followed since the implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law, but also diverges from the mainstream regulatory model in the European Union, under which such conduct is classified as a hardcore restriction and excluded from block exemption. From an economic perspective, resale price maintenance may generate procompetitive effects, such as alleviating double marginalization and preventing free-riding, while also producing anticompetitive effects, including weakening price competition and inhibiting channel innovation and market entry. In the subsequent improvement of the legal framework, resale price maintenance should, in principle, be excluded from the safe harbor regime. Undertakings should instead be guided to seek relief through the competitive-effects defense under Article 18(2) of the Anti-Monopoly Law or through individual exemption under Article 20. If the application of the safe harbor regime to resale price maintenance is retained, a multidimensional assessment framework incorporating cumulative effects and market ranking must be established. At the same time, the order of application among the safe harbor rule, the competitive-effects defense, and individual exemption should be clarified so as to eliminate conflicts among these regimes. 2025年12月，国家市场监督管理总局修订《禁止垄断协议规定》，细化纵向垄断协议不予禁止的市场份额与配套适用条件。本次制度修订将转售价格维持纳入安全港制度适用范围，该规则设计既区别于我国《反垄断法》实施以来对转售价格维持的严格规制路径，也与欧盟将该类行为认定为核心限制、排除集体豁免的主流规制模式形成制度分野。在经济学视角下，转售价格维持具有缓解双重边际化、抑制搭便车行为的积极效应以及削弱价格竞争、抑制渠道创新与市场进入的消极效应。在后续制度完善过程中，原则上应将转售价格维持排除在安全港制度之外，引导经营者通过《反垄断法》第十八条第二款的竞争效果抗辩或第二十条的个案豁免寻求救济。若保留其适用，则必须构建包括累积效应、市场排名在内的多维评估体系，同时厘清“安全港制度—竞争效果抗辩—个案豁免”的适用顺位，以消除制度之间的适用冲突。
• DOI: 10.35534/pss.0807102 (registering DOI)
• Cite: 刘云天．转售价格维持的安全港制度适用研究［J］．社会科学进展，2026，8（7）：590-595.