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从增长竞争到协同竞赛：地方政府行为的转型逻辑——以山西省“一群两区三圈”为例

From Growth Competition to Collaborative Contest: The Transformation Logic of Local Government Behavior —A Case Study of Shanxi Province’s “One Cluster, Two Zones, Three Circles”

Progress in Social Sciences / 2026,8(3): 167-173 / 2026-03-24 7 3

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• Authors: 潘姝心
• Information:

  南京工业大学法政学院，南京

• Keywords:
  Administrative subcontracting; Political tournaments; Regional collaborative governance; Local government behavior
  行政发包制; 政治锦标赛; 区域协同治理; 地方政府行为
• Abstract: Against the backdrop of regional governance shifting from “competition for growth” to “contest for collaboration,” this paper aims to explore the following questions: How do provincial governments promote crossadministrative coordination through the restructuring of incentive mechanisms? How does the behavioral logic of local governments evolve accordingly? What implications does this practice have for understanding the transformation of local governance in China? Taking Shanxi Province’s “One Cluster, Two Zones, Three Circles” as a case study and applying the theoretical frameworks of “administrative subcontracting” and “political tournaments,” this paper finds that provincial governments have developed a new governance model characterized by “provincial-level coordinated subcontracting, municipal-level multi-dimensional contests, and institutionalized implicit coordination” through reconstructing performance assessments, designing collaborative contest rules, and establishing coordination platforms. This has facilitated the transition of local governments from simple competitors to “co-opetitors.” The study shows that regional collaborative governance has driven the iteration of traditional incentive mechanisms, but the lack of institutionalized mechanisms for deep-seated interest coordination remains a key bottleneck. It further reflects: Can “collaborative contest” become a sustainable incentive model? How can a scientifically quantifiable collaborative performance system be constructed? 在区域治理从“为增长而竞争”转向“为协同而竞赛”的背景下，本文旨在探究：省级政府如何通过激励结构调整推动跨行政区协同？地方政府的行为逻辑又如何随之演变？这一实践对理解中国地方政府治理转型有何启示？本文以山西省“一群两区三圈”为案例，结合“行政发包制”与“政治锦标赛”理论分析发现：省级政府通过重构考核、设计协同竞赛规则与搭建协调平台，形成了“省级统筹发包、市级多维竞赛、机制化隐性协调”的新治理模式，促使地方政府从单一竞争者转变为“竞合者”。研究表明，区域协同治理推动了传统激励机制的迭代，但深层次利益协调机制的制度化不足仍是关键瓶颈。进而思考：“协同竞赛”能否成为可持续的激励模式？如何构建科学可量化的协同绩效体系？
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.35534/pss.0803030 (registering DOI)
• Cite: 潘姝心．从增长竞争到协同竞赛：地方政府行为的转型逻辑——以山西省“一群两区三圈”为例［J］．社会科学进展，2026，8（3）：167-173.